The youngest Triple-A and Double-A clubs in baseball both made the playoffs, the first time that was accomplished by Cardinals’ clubs in a quarter of a century.
Despite a down year overall across the St. Louis Cardinals minor league system, the top two levels not only contributed players to the success of the major league club, but were winners on the field as well. Triple-A Memphis was league champion while Double-A Springfield made the playoffs.
You don’t think that was a big deal? Well, it was.
2009 was the first time the Cardinals’ top two minor league teams played in the postseason in the same year in a quarter of a century. Not since the 1985 Louisville Redbirds won the American Association crown and the Arkansas Travelers appeared in the Texas League playoffs had St. Louis’ Triple-A and Double-A clubs made the playoffs together.
The 2009 success bodes well for the future as it was accomplished despite each having been the youngest teams at their respective levels in all of minor league baseball. Not just the youngest in their league, mind you, but in all of Triple-A and Double-A!
Chris “Hammer” Maloney’s 2009 Memphis Redbirds finished on top of the Pacific Coast League, earning their first league championship since 2000 in their only appearance in the playoffs since then. The Redbirds posted a 77-67 regular season record, then stormed to the PCL title over Albuquerque and Sacramento before falling to Durham in the single-game Triple-A championship.
At the Double-A level, Ron “Pop” Warner led Springfield to their third consecutive winning campaign and returned the Cardinals to the Texas League playoffs after a one-year absence. It was a year of contrasts as they began with a first-place divisional finish and a 38-32 record, clinching a post-season berth in the process.
After several of their league-best nine All-Stars were lost, the Cards limped home with a second-half record of 33-37. Among the most painful subtractions were first-half offensive leader Daniel Descalso, promoted to Triple-A, and 2008 organization Player of the Year Daryl Jones, sidelined by a slow-to-heal hamstring injury.
Springfield tied for last place after the break, though they were only four games out of first. Had the Texas League used full-season standings, Springfield would not have made the post-season. Their overall regular-season record was two games over .500 at 71-69, their poorest result since 2006. Springfield then quickly exited from the North Division finals as they were swept by second-half winner Northwest Arkansas in three games.
Memphis’ championship season was far from a wire-to-wire, coasting-to-the-championship cake walk. As late as June 21, the Redbirds were 8 ½ games out of first at what would be a season-low six games under .500 at 32-38. At the time, they were coming off a 4-14 stretch of losing baseball.
It would have been easy to leave the Redbirds for dead, especially after the Mark DeRosa and Matt Holliday trades stripped them of their top starter, Clayton Mortensen (ten quality starts, seven wins, 105 innings, 82 strikeouts), top reliever, Jess Todd (24 of 26 in save opportunities), and top hitter, Brett Wallace (.298 BA, number one Cardinals prospect).
St. Louis made at least 21 different calls for players from Memphis during the season, many of them taken away multiple times, yet Maloney held his team together, buoyed by reinforcements from Springfield.
After their late-June low point, the Redbirds put together an impressive 26-13 (.667) run over the next month and a half. On August 4, they had climbed back to seven games over .500 at 58-51, tying their season high water mark first set on May 9. Despite a very tough schedule over the final month, the Redbirds held serve with a 19-16 finish that carried them into their successful playoff run.
Allen Craig led the Redbirds offense and was named the Player of the Year by both the Cardinals organization and us at The Cardinal Nation/Scout.com. The 25-year-old posted a line of .322/.374/.547 with 26 home runs and 83 RBI. He led the Redbirds in runs, hits, doubles, triples, home runs, total bases and RBI.
Springfield workhorse starter Lance Lynn took home Pitcher of the Year honors from both the Cardinals and The Cardinal Nation. Lynn delivered an 11-4 record and a 2.92 ERA, the latter good for third in the Texas League. He fanned 98 but also walked 51 in 126 1/3 Double-A innings.
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[...] Miller 17. John Smoltz 16. Change in centerfield 15. Shortstop shuffle 14. Whitey to the Hall 13. Memphis and Springfield success 12. 11. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. [...]
If it is so that 2009 was the first time in a quarter-century that the AAA and AA teams both made their respective playoffs in the same season, this seems revealing of something.
While the PCL is a large league, the Texas League (AA) is just 8 teams and 4 qualify for the playoffs. So a TL team should make the playoffs every other year, if talent were evenly distributed.
It would seem hard to go as long as 25 years without the AA/AAA teams making the playoffs together a few times.
And if these teams were among the youngest for their respective classifications, this illustrates that the Cards are not signing many minor league free agents and retreads, but devoting roster spots to homegrown players. This is a good business practice, for the longrun. It bespeaks well of Mo and Luhnow to devote the minor league to developing and providing opportunities to their own signees.
Between Memphis and Springfield, the Cards had at least a potential replacement-level major leaguer at every position. The stats guys say that Craig, Freese and Jay may be slightly more than that — guys projected to be worth 1-2 wins at the big-league level in 2010.
And of course Garcia could be worth quite a bit more than that, if he builds enough stamina to throw 180-200 IP a season without getting reinjured.
Our system gets criticized, fairly and accurately, for not having the high-impact guys. But there’s value to having a AAA roster filled with guys in their mid-20s who can at least keep positions warm at the major league level.
So that’s one thing to give Luhnow credit for — he and his staff are good at finding college players who can quickly advance to AA and AAA and provide at least replacement-level bodies for the varsity. Now the challenge is to figure out how organizations like the Phillies manage to find and develop the high-ceiling talent that produces impact players.
Jumbo, rest assured that I did not make the data up. Be aware that the Cardinals’ Triple-A club spent many years in the eight-team American Association before joining the PCL. Further, it has been over 20 years since the Cardinals’ Double-A and high-A clubs were in the playoffs during the same season, a streak that is still active.
Lou, a solid assessment.
A major league replacement level player at every position – is our standard that low? If you told me we had a 1 or 2 win player (a player with value) at every position I’d start to take notice.
CC, I did say “at least.” And obviously I don’t think our standard is to develop replacement-level players. I’m just pointing out that what we have isn’t worthless.
The Cubs just signed Marlon Byrd for 3/15. If we can develop guys with his present value (~1-1.5 wins above replacement), and put them on the field for minimum wage, we save money to use for guys like Holliday and that eventual Pujols extension.
Or, put another way: the future probably won’t include any more Juan Encarnacions.
Nice to hear some positives about the top two Cardinals farm teams for 2009, good point about them being the youngest teams at their levels in all of MiLB.
As much as the Cardinals ownership and management gets bashed by many, it could be much worse.
Just look on the other side of Missouri–as usual Posnanski is right on.
http://joeposnanski.com/JoeBlog/2010/01/02/the-royal-decade/
That the Cards have not had both top minor league squads in playoffs in the same year for a quarter century is a telling fact. And that they did make the playoffs in 2009, with younger squads, is indicative of improved personnel management. More guys contribute for more years in the minors. Instead of a lot of releases (talent wastage) at the A level, more men advance to get a chance at AA or even AAA. This reduces the need to hire minor league free agents to staff the higher teams. Its probably good for morale among minor league players, managers, and scouts.
Lou mentions the Phillies. The guy who deserved credit with the Phillies as their talent guy was Mike Arbuckle, now with the Royals.
An interesting thing about the Phillies is they have sometimes signed high upside collegiates who the Cards have not selected:
–1B Ryan Howard in the 5th round out of SWMissouri State in 2001 is an example; 6’4″, left swinger, rated 220 pounds on draft day; he had a ML physique.
–The Cards selected before the Phils in the 2000 draft first round, but it was the Phils who chose Chase Utley, left swinging hitter from USC or UCLA; maybe the Cards had selected Adam Kennedy in 1997, so did not want to go for the 2B college star again, but it was a lost opportunity.
–20th round in 2006, the Phils signed corner OF Dominic Brown, a great find, compared to Darryl Strawberry. He was a 6’5″ left swinging unheralded kid out of a Georgia high school.
–5th round 2007, corner OF Taylor from Stanford U, 6’6″ 250 lbs. Taylor has now been traded for Brett Wallace, so the As think he has some potential.
In these 4 examples, Arbuckle scored by drafting physiques (Howard, Taylor, Brown) with upside. Impact players are important.
Some other Arbuckle finds were LHP Hamels (round 1 out of a San Diego high school), SS Rollins (out of a California high school, one of the best switch-hitter SSes since the Cards found Gary Templeton), and Scott Rolen (Indiana HS, 2nd round). These were hits with HS selections at high rounds. Great choices, but well known high profile players to scouts so their draft rank and subsequent performance is not surprising, whereas Utley, Howard, Brown, and Taylor were extra smart choices, three being lowish round finds.
I keep wondering what is a high impact player among amateur players.
Howard certanly was not considered that when he was drafted or he would not have lasted to the 5th round. Pujols certainly was not considered impact in 1999.
I recall that Utley was considered a risk draft choice in 2000. The book on him was that he would not have the skills to stay a middle infielder. His hitting was considered solid and at that time considered comparable to Adam Kennedy.
Rollins was second round. Hardly considered high impact at the time.
The Braves gave up on Wainwright, now considered high impact.
Would you consider a high school shortstop who has a major league glove and his 12 homers his senior year an impact player? that is what the Cardinals selected in 07.
The youth at AA and AAA is a result of the Cardinals agressive promotion policy. And seems to have paid off. However, the down side is that it weakened the lower levels of the organization. The Palm Beach Maybe the Latin program will fill the gap. Would be nice to also get more players from the Pacific Rim.
Palm Beach started the season very strong. But then Kozma, Peterson, Sedbrook, Luna and Smith was promoted to Springfield along with Lynn, Sanchez, Freeman and later Additon and Mulligan. This movement was caused by the promotion of Wallace, Hamilton, Descalso, Norrick and Parise to Memphis.
Sooner, thanks for joining the discussion. I have a different recollection than you on several points so went back to check. In 2009, Palm Beach improved as the season went on, unlike Springfield. PB had a far better second half (four games under .500) than first (12 games under). In addition, I previously demonstrated that the rate of Cardinals in-season player movement during 2009 was about average for the Luhnow years and less than in 2008, even though the system in aggregate had a far better W-L record in 2008. Here is the link to that study.
I am glad that I did not read an earlier thread about player promotions.
Luhnow has been aggressive in advancing players. Comparing 2009 in-season promotions versus other Luhnow years is going to tend to be an unproductive comparison, analytically.
Aggression has to be compared to the level a guy should be at, versus where he plays. This requires timecomsuming consideration of amateur/pro experience. For instance, Pete Kozma started 09 at Palm Beach. This was a suitable level for Pete, given a high school background, JC in 07, Quad Cities in 2008. Unless Pete is a superstar, which he is not, skipping him over high A ball would not make a lot of sense. However, he had to play at AA in 2009, because of the needs of the system (K. Greene problem leading to cascading callups) rather than the needs of Pete. The Cards probably had a few more people playing at overly high levels in 2009 than in 2008 (hough Casey Mulligan beginning the year at Quad Cities is an opposite example of team under-assignment).
The perception of aggressive promotions offered by others were anecdotal and subjective. Via using hard transaction data for the entire system over six years to evaluate the subject, my conclusions contradict views held comfortable by some, hence a return to anecdotes and subjectivity in an attempt to talk around it. (For example, who can accurately define at what level each player should be at any given point in time?)
The motivation for the original study was to debunk the theory, presented as fact by some, that unusually aggressive player movements in 2009 contributed to the down season across the system compared to 2008. The data shot down that idea. Rather than accept it, alternatively, one can just return to avoiding the discussion entirely.
(Edit: Going into the work, I wondered if 2009 movement might show itself to be higher than the norm. What had stuck in my head was the mass moves executed across the system at the start of August – over two dozen players changing teams at once. Turns out that during the 2009 season prior to that point, the minor league rosters had actually been more static than in the past.)
Jumbo’s perception that 09 results are due to player movement is not disproved by Brian’s data and analysis. Think in terms of quality of moves rather than quantity of moves. If Mr. Prospect is moved from A to AA solely because he has shown that he is ready, that’s a high quality move. If he is moved from A to AA mainly for reasons other than that he is ready, that is a low quality move. I could see circumstances where stuff that happens, trades and injuries, unexpected set-backs, whatever, could cause a chain reaction of low quality moves rippling through the system. So Brian’s data show only that the number of moves is not a factor. My gut feeling agrees with Jumbo’s perception that player movement in 09 was different than in 08 and was responsible for the fall off in results. That’s a gut feeling, I can’t prove it.
I call your two perceptions and raise you six factoids! As acknowledged, qualitative measures as suggested cannot be proven, so I will stand behind what I can prove. On a sample as large as six years, anomalies should be smoothed out.
Now, since perceptions are in bounds, here is mine. Being it is the most current, memories are by far the freshest about this past season. Even if we could all magically agree on the definition, who can remember if there were more “higher quality” moves in 2008 versus 2009 for example, let alone 2006? Without multiple years, there is no way to define what is normal and what is above or below normal.
It will be interesting to see the aggregate records of the top six minor league clubs in 2010. 2009 was very comparable to 2005, 2006 and 2007, all sub-.500 years. So far, 2008 is a sample of one in terms of that particular measure of success. I am quite confident that if 2010 remains down, there will be ample apologies ready to be served up, just as in 2009.
If there is improvement, I will be first to applaud the progress. I suspect the aging of the strong 2005 draft class will require the 2009 draft class to step up for that to occur. Anderson and Jones are a couple from 2005 who could bounce back and really help, though. Garcia and Greene may do their work in the majors.
Brian, you invented a theory as to what you think that I said and then debunked this claim of your invention. If I ignored your thread, it was because it did not sound promising and I did not want to nitpick.
In general, its a nice thing to find numbers with which to make points. But sometimes, the right data are not easily obtained. Bling has a good point about quality versus quantity.
It might make my point more clear for me to say that player movement in 08 was (qualitatively) different from in 09, 05, 06, 07, and this could explain the 08 anomaly.
bb, so what you suggest is that while the number of total 2008 transactions was higher, they were lower quality moves which had less negative impact on team records and led to more all-stars, Futures Game participants, top prospects, etc.? Not agreeing, just trying to understand.
One of us is mixed up here, Brian. Something is responsible for 08 success and 09 return to normalcy. It seems that number of moves is not the explaination if I understood your article and am remembering it right. So I theorize that in 08 there were less low quality movements than usual, and correspondingly more high quality movements. 09 then saw reversion to the norm of too many low quality movements. Is it not possible that having such young AA and AAA squads is due to players being moved up for reasons other than that they have shown that they are ready (my definition of low quality movement)? I’ll see your factoids and raise a postulation.
I’ll check.
I take that to mean you concede the point.
No, that would have been a fold. I just didn’t feel up to a high quality reply.
Maybe comparing ages between levels from 2008 to 2009 would be a better analysis?
I have no idea what that would show. IF teams were younger over all in 2009 than 2008 it could provide the basis for a theory. Of course, there are starting ages and finishing ages – dont know if that would cause a calculating problem.