A question was posed on the Batavia roster thread about the success rate of signing St. Louis Cardinals draft picks. I don’t have the highest percent signed by year in the history of the draft, but I do have the results from recent seasons – the years Jeff Luhnow has led the organization’s drafts.
I included both quantities signed as well as noting the top pick that remained unsigned. The lowest-yield year was 2006, but even then, the Cards signed their top ten picks and 20 of their first 22.
The failed Kyle Russell (pictured) negotiations in 2007 kept the fourth-rounder from Texas in school. Though there was disappointment at the time, at least the player himself seems to have been overrated. Still, with the benefit of clear hindsight, having been able to use that selection on another quality player would have been preferred.
The 2008 record of top 30 picks signed is admirable, but there is a necessary asterisk applied. 13th rounder Mitchell Harris‘ Navy commitment keeps him off the mound for a considerable period. He is technically signed, but obviously unable to contribute.
The Cardinals have a good start in 2009, with as many as 38 already committed at the time this post was made. While picks number one, three, four, seven and ten are among the unsigned, there remains plenty of runway to get their deals done. If so, a take of 43 would be very consistent with recent years.
Of course, signing is but one measure. Though a necessary step, it is a very early one. More important is the quantity and quality of major leaguers that evolve from these drafts, a final verdict for which the jury will remain out for some time.
| Draft | Signed | Picks | % Signed | Top Signed | 1st Unsigned | Name |
| 2009 | TBD | 52 | ||||
| 2008 | 43 | 51 | 84.3% | 1st 30* | 30th round* | RHP Brett Bruening |
| 2007 | 45 | 52 | 86.5% | 1st four | 4th round | OF Kyle Russell |
| 2006 | 38 | 53 | 71.7% | 1st 12 | 10th round | RHP Blair Erickson |
| 2005 | 43 | 51 | 84.3% | 1st 15 | 12th round | RHP Daniel McCutchen |
After not signing in 2005, McCutcheon signed with the Yanks after a senior campaign. He moved up fast and was included in a trade with the Pirates last summer. He is a borderline prospect as reliever. In summer 2005, there was an issue about the coach at the Univ. of Oklahoma; there was a new one or the incumbent was retained, I forget. This may have induced collegiate teammates Rohlinger and McCutcheon to return. Rohlinger was listed by the Cards as signed, but then must have unsigned himself and returned to Oklahoma. Rohlinger has seen the majors with the Giants, though this may owe to their neediness.
Eriksen was a closer at Cal-Irvine (source of Gorgen and Bihona). He starred as a freshman, had mixed success later. He fell to the 10th rd after his third year and was rumored to have turned down a generous bonus offer from the Cards. In 07, the Twins grabbed him at about the same round and he shuld have gotten a bonus in the $10,000 ballpark. Last I knew, he was still in the Florida State League (in contrast to another senior from the 07 draft, Mortensen, up at AAA).
Russell was ranked pre-2007-draft as a 1-S round talent. He wanted an above slot bonus and was a hard to sign sophmore, so fell to the 4th round. The Cards probably would have been willing to give him a supplemental round bonus, but he wanted more. One of his teammates with about the same scouting grade in fact got more from the Yankees, so a lot can depend on who selects you. In 2008, Russell got a slot bonus in the 3rd round, so by not signing with the Cards he may have lost $400,000 in bonus and lost a year of pro time. His choice and his lesson.
Hard-throwing Bruening was a first year juco, very unpolished. He agreed to accept an offer to attend LSU for the 2010 baseball season. A number of 4 year colleges with advanced baseball programs such as LSU will use junior colleges as their farm teams and introduce players such as Bruening as juniors.
This thread’s topic may invite the question, what is the most useful reference point to enable perspective about the signing rate among draftees?
If I knew where the information was conveniently available, I would want to compare the signing rate of the Cards to all other teams in MLB at any given year.
Even this is a crude, imperfect metric, because it would be preferable to compare on an amateur classification matched basis (ie., compare the signing rate of high schoolers by the Cards to high schoolers by other teams, so one does not compare signing college seniors ready to start pro ball versus another team signing younger kids who are less ready to do so, which would seem misleading). If the teams fully divulged all signing bonuses, this would be useful data to integrate into an inter-team comparison, because money can have a distorting effect on draft rounds.
My impression would be that in recent years, the Cards sign a higher percentage of draftees than they did in the 1970-90s. This may be in keeping with all teams, not just the Cards, I do not know.
Because of apparently early success in signing low round picks and if they continue recent success in signing high round guys, 2009 should yield a high overall signing rate, still a little better than recent years.
Brian notes that the signing rate is but one metric, and “more important is the quantity and quality of major leaguers that evolve from these drafts.”
I would agree that the signing rate is a metric of ambiguous value. On the one hand, it would seem a poor do if the Cards did not sign a lot of their chosen targets. It would be hard to see this as a positive. OTOH, if you come up with a few winners among those you do sign, those who did not sign are long forgotten. This probably agrees largely with Brian’s quoted statement.
Many teams may see an additional mission not only to produce ML talent, but to staff a strong minor league system, in part because there is some degree of randomness about a broad class of potential AAAA talents and who among them will get lucky to get a chance to play in the majors. A few rare talents may be destined for the majors, barring injury. Yet most guys are not so exceptional, rather potentially good ballplayers. A team would like to sign them to staff the minor league system and when at AAA, if they get lucky, they may get a call to the Show, like UDFA Josh Kinney in 2006. If a team has a strong system with depth, then it can obtain reinforcements from players at AAA, when vacancies occur in the majors.
A metric that might track this business objective would be the won-loss record of minor league teams, on an age-adjusted basis.
Not sure I agree with you on minor league records, but here are the Cards’ non-age adjusted results over the last quarter century: link.
When Luhnow came on board he faced a AAA roster and to some extent a AA roster filled with 6 year free agents and others who lacked the ability to contribute to the major league team.
His drafts have pretty well stocked the AAA and AA level and the age level of the players at that level and some of the numbers they have produced indicate that at least some will be able to contribute at the major league level. In spite of that condition the pre-Luhnow drafts did provide Pujols, Molina and other solid performers.
There have been inferences from some of the press with purported rumblings from the teams field management that Luhnow has provided little or no impact players but a quantity of helpers, particularly in the pitching department. You would have to give some credence to that in that a temporary rotation spot is still filled by the journeyman Brad Thompson and Wellemeyer and Piniero are up and down performers and no one has moved up from the farm system to replace them.
I think it premature to write off the Luhnow drafts as lacking impact players. Certainly Rasmus and Perez are showing signs of becoming such a commodity and it is early to write off Todd, Ottavino, Wallace, Jones, Descalso, Lynn, Mortensen, et. al. Motte is more of an accident as was Pujols being available to be drafted in the 13th round.
The 09 draft is a clear departure to some extent and if the lack of impact tag is accurate at all the Cardinals appear to have taken a shot at the more high risk-high reward types at least in early rounds. The mid and late rounds look vaguely familiar compared to earlier Luhnow drafts. One thing that stands out is that they have drafted a fair number of position players who have good numbers, particularly on base percentage type numbers with more walks than strikeouts. Also a number of players who had a bad 09 following better seasons in 08. Also it appears that they have not moved away from the strong statistical performers while drafting a number of players with woeful stats.
The bottom line of course is how many players are produced that contribute to a championship team. And while winning minor league teams are an indicator it doesn’t always result in eventual success at the major league level. A constant stream of impact performers from average or below average minor league teams will do the job.
The Big Red Machine was developed by a Rose (1963), Helms (1964), Lee Maye (1965), Bench (1967), Perez (1964), Concepcion (Concepcion (1970), Duffy (1970), Griffey Sr (1973), et al. coming on from a fairly mediocre Reds minor league system as far as wins and losses were concerned. Then they used Helms and Maye to pick up Joe Morgan and Cesar Geronimo from the Astros and Duffy to obtain George Foster from San Francisco.
The Reds would have been totally awesome if development of pitching matched their acquisition of position players.
So if a Rasmus and a Wallace and maybe a Jones and/or Descalso are really impact players maybe Luhnow and his organization has started something with the Cardinals. Basically it took the Reds 13 years after Rose was signed in 1970 to develop their dynasty. So how can we know after only a fifth draft.
I agree that the AAA and AA teams used to be stocked with many post-prime minor league free agents. (Bernie pointed this out and got doubted by some.)
This must have bothered DeWitt as well. Because the purpose of your minor league system is to develop talent for the majors, not just win games in the minors. So you could want to stock your minor league system, as much as possible, with guys hopeful and motivated to improve themselves so as to become ML candidates. This will yield in due course a stronger taxi squad, with more depth, at AAA.
Here is an anecdote that I find interesting. In 2005, after the first day of the draft, Luhnow said that they noticed Buckman was still available and were elated that they were able to select him in Rd 19 on day 2. Buckman was a senior or 5ht year from the Univ of Nebraska. Now why would you be elated to draft him? He is a mature guy, ready from day 1 for pro ball. At A ball, he can provide batting order protection for younger draftees like Rasmus, Jones, Anderson. You can assume Buckman could play AA or AAA ball (if there are roster slots enough, though this year there was not). Some would unkindly say Buckman was system fill. I would suggest he had AAAA potential. He had the potential to rise to AAA and play productively, helping the system. In addition, if Fate were kind to him, he might get a shot at the majors, whereas if he is not lucky, as many men are not, then he would not get such a chance, as once befell Josh Kinney and Bo Hart.
So when we draft guys like Stavinoha, Roth, Buckman, Craig, Freese (picked by San Diego, a similar Moneyball team), Hill, Henley, and this year, Conley, Ahlmad (sp?), and the 5th year 3B out of TCU, we are valuing mature men who can enter pro ball and hit the little white thing. They can rise to AA and AAA. They can potentially contribute to the majors as well, should an opening arise, though they are not highly likely to do this, because they may not have a great positional fit. This is why they are not higher round selections.
I am unsure the selection of Kyle Russell was a bad decision. Russell could become a ML player in due course. He has prototypical size for RF, moves ok, good arm, lefty bat. He has probably now altered his swing to adjust to wooden bat baseball.
The Cards made an informed gamble in 2007. They knew Russell had an uppercut grooved swing. It was no surprise he could not hit well with the Santa Barbara team that July, because he should not have been able to do so, given his swing.
The likeliest reason we asked Russell to play summer ball was to have further grounds for discussion with him and his agent about an appropriate bonus, given his stage of development. There was a difference of opinion between what the player wanted and what the team thought fair to offer as a bonus. Since Russell was a sophmore, it was easy for him to hold out for more money and if things fell through, to return to college. After he saw a team-mate get a big bonus from the Yankees, this outcome is not surprising. The biggest gamble with Russell may have been his sophmore status, even more than college swing.
Didn’t say Russell was a bad choice, but with the benefit of hindsight, I imagine even the Cards wished they had selected someone else.
Sorry if I misparaphrased you, Brian. I am trying to suggest is that when a team makes calculated gambles on tricky to sign guys, it has to be comfortable accepting that they will not all work out. We may be misled nowadays by the high signing rate to regard a non-signing as a mistake.
I do have not a conveniently reliable list of Did Not Signs. Instead I have some unreliable notions that we did not sign our 2nd rounder in 1977; 3rd rounder Mike Moore in 1978 who later went #1 in the nation; 3rd rounder in 1979; 2nd rounder LHP Dan Plesac in 1980; 11th rounder Rob Dibble in 1982, etc. Overall, in recent years, I would guess that we do a better job on signability, though hunting for data to verify this impression might be more effort than I care to commit.
In 2006, we were not able to sign 9 of the final 11 draft picks. The Did Not Signs were concentrated at low rounds, not a surprise.
In 2009, if Heisler and Lavigne sign, they would make it 8 signees among the final 12 draft picks. That seems pretty good, for low rounds, for the first week.
I’m really suprised that they have signed that many. Don’t know where they are going to put everyone. Probably a lot of releases coming up.
To follow-up on McCutchen, my Sooners were coached by Larry Cochelle who made some inappropriate remarks toward blacks and was dismissed during the 2005 season. They initially hired Gene Stephenson from Wichita St who then backed out of the deal after just a few hours. The Sooners then hired the interim head coach Sonny Golloway. Golloway had a good relationship with that group and brought back several returners. McCutchen and Rohlinger had great seasons in 2006. I would note that McCutchen tested positive for some PED and was suspended for 50 games.
And I have beed arguing elsewhere that the new Cards strategy appears to be to use their metrics to find players who can produce, even deep in drafts. They did that because the organization lacked depth. They needed guys who projected more easily, even if they had limited upside because the system needed help. The major league team was reliant on wash outs and reclamation projects because the overall system was poor. Now that the system has developed some depth and there are several solid prospects, you will see the Cards start to take some chances. I don’t think that means that they will have drafts full of high reward/high risk kinds of players. However, if the draft presents chances to take a high upside player they will do so. I also think you will see money being spent on international players.
Now may be a good time to revisit the 2009 and other recent drafts. Overall, I think they have been very good, for the money invested.
The 2009 draft is looking very good, with Miller, Stock, Kelly, and Jackson off to decent starts at Quad Cities.
I read recently that the highest round guy not to sign, little lefty Bibona, passed on a bonus of $115,000. Thats solid money for the 16th round, so shows the Cards made him a good offer, but he had other goals.
Looking back at the past 5 drafts:
I would give 2005 an A for selections, with some points off for development problems. Rasmus and Jaime Garcia have done well; Greene, Boggs, Stavinoha have done well at AAA; Anderson, Jones, King, Garceau are not without promise. The problems were arm woes for McCormick and Wilson, and other problems with Herron. Not sure any of these could have been foreseen. Those who got away include Oklahoma players McCutcheon and Rohlinger, who are ML fringy, and a coaching change at their college kept them from signing.
2006: B+ for selections. There were some really good choices, but points are knocked off for vaulting Brad Furnish a few rounds in pre-draft rankings, while passing on a budding star like Masterson, now with the Indians. Nick Additon was a late round find, to go with Ottavino, Perez, Jay, Hamilton, Craig up high. Daley has had problems, but may be bouncing back. Edwards, Pham, Mulligan are developing. Gregerson is in San Diego already. Shorey and the great Cazana are at Memphis. A lot of good picks. Got away: Zdawksi (15)
2007: B- for selections. Todd excelled in the minors, was traded, as was Mortensen. Kopp has had bad luck injuries. Kozma may turn out well in time. Descalso is to AAA. There was a disconnect between Kyle Russell (4) and the team. Eager (5) in lieu of OF Michael Taylor, and Marmol, ouch. Reifer in the 11th may turn out well, as well as Chambers (38).
2008: A-. Wallace (1), Lynn (1S), Peterson(2). Vasquez (3) may rebound from a hard 2009. Curtis (5) was an overdraft. Bets on Shepherd (11), Swinson (12), Harris (13) (military duty), Cutler (14), Mateo (20), Freeman (32) look reasonable.
2009: A. Questions about his shoulder, but Bittle (4) has avoided an operation. Miller (1), Stock (2), Kelly (3), Jackson (5), Stidham (8), Schneider (20), Adams (23) off to good starts. Less experienced players Hill (6), Hernandez (10), Washington (15), Garcia (18) may turn out well.
Without spending over slot very often, the Cards are cultivating a breadth of US players.
Methinks Jumbo hails from Lake Wobegon, where all the children are above average.
Just so long as the women are strong and the men are thought to be good looking, I must accept the fate of geographic determinism.